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INTRODUCTIONI_.
As the title of his subject suggests, one of the 
responsibilities of the student of international relations 
is the description and explanation of changes in political 
relations between nations. This responsibility is most 
pressing when at least one of the countries concerned is 
important in a global or regional context, and when its 
relationships with other states are in a delicate stage 
or in a process of transition.
There are many ways of studying changes in interstate 
relations. Treaties and other government-to-government 
agreements can be examined for what they may reveal about 
the relationship at an official level. But such 
agreements are usually very crude indicators as they seldom 
reflect changes on a year-by-year (even less on a month- 
by-month) basis. Government, or press, statements are 
frequently consulted to provide information on ephemeral 
changes. However, these sources are often suspect for 
they might - owing to ideological or propaganda reasons - 
not accurately reveal that country's thinking on some 
foreign policy issue'.
A more reliable guide to interstate relations may 
be the study of less formal links between the countries 
concerned. A study of fluctuations in the level of 
bilateral trade, investment flows, cultural and sporting 
links, and the exchange of tourists, may provide the 
necessary information.
2Yet other methods may be employed. A common technique 
is to focus on some issue in dispute between the nations 
concerned. The student will try to determine whether 
policy changes with respect to the controversy parallel 
broader political changes between the disputants. Generally, 
the more sensitive the issue the more useful it is as a 
barometer of political change.
Often the most sensitive issues between nation 
states involve border disputes and other problems related 
to territorial sovereignty. Such disputes might have 
historical or cultural origins as, for example, the dispute 
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Or the squabble 
might be over a strip of land (or water) considered to 
be of strategic value - as is the case between Syria and 
Israel over the Golon Heights. Sometimes, however, such 
disputes might be connected with resource development.
The political geographer J.R.V. Prescott has noted that 
'the commonest source of such disputes are water bodies 
which mark or cross any boundary, and the territorial 
waters and continental shelf areas'
Of the latter type of sovereignty dispute, probably 
no other has had such an impact on recent interstate 
relations as that involving claims to offshore areas 
believed rich in oil. Dramatic rises in the price of OPEC 
crude, and the continued insecurity of supply from the 
Middle East, have made the possession of domestic oil 
reserves increasingly important. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, most coastal states are anxious to lay claim
to as large an area of their continental shelves as 
possible. Unfortunately, for the sake of world order, 
international law as it relates to the sea is so ambiguous 
that many competing offshore claims - while each might 
be strictly legal - overlap.
Few parts of the globe have been as affected by
■kthis problem as East Asia. The following pages will 
note that this region is believed to contain some of 
the world's largest undersea reserves of oil. The coastal 
countries have rushed to stake their claims to the 
region's continental shelves and ocean basins. Much of 
the recent action in this respect has taken place in the 
Yellow, East China and South China Seas.
It is this subject - offshore oil claims in East 
Asia - that provides the focus of the following dissertation. 
Emphasis will be given to the way in which offshore oil 
controversies help to describe changes in intra-regional 
political relations - especially those between China and 
its neighbours.
China has beeri given particular stress for not only 
is it the region's largest (and, in many senses, strongest) 
power, but it is also a country busy redirecting its foreign 
policy. This paper will, therefore, pay almost exclusive 
attention to offshore disputes between China and those
* For the purposes of this paper, the East Asia region 
embraces that part of mainland and offshore Asia lying to 
the east of the Andaman Sea and to the north of the Timor 
Sea. The Soviet Union is not included.
4countries - Japan, the Philippines and North Vietnam - 
which have a delicately evolving relationship with Peking.
It will be noted that competition for ownership over 
promising areas of the continental shelves has already 
brought many nations of the East Asia region into 
confrontation. The fact that confrontation has seldom 
led to open conflict suggests that narrow economic 
considerations have often given way to broader political 
determinants of national self-interest. A detailed 
examination of the controversies over offshore claims in 
the East and South China Seas bears out this suggestion.
Such an examination also serves to explain one of
the apparent paradoxes of East Asian offshore oil development.
->•
The following pages will reveal how it was in the years 
immediately preceding the oil crisis - 1969 to 1973 - 
that most of the claims concerning offshore oil in the 
region were fiercely contested. Since the oil crisis, 
however, when one would normally have expected national 
claims to oil to be even more hotly pursued, the debate 
has been relatively, muted.
The fact that the Senkakus, Paracels and Spratlies 
and other offshore areas believed rich in oil no longer 
make headline news cannot adequately be explained by 
changes in the world oil situation. The relative calm of 
the past two years can only be explained against the 
background of the evolving political situation in the 
East Asian region. The continuing Sino-Soviet split, 
Washington's detente with Peking and Moscow, America's
'retreat' from mainland Asia, and the 'fall' of South 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, have all contributed to an 
atmosphere of great political uncertainty. The nations 
of the region are anxiously assessing which country, or 
group of countries, holds the new balance of power.
During this delicate period most East Asian states are 
careful not to make any political moves that might unduly 
antagonise any of their neighbours. Most significantly, 
the last two years or so have witnessed a somewhat more 
cooperative and relaxed relationship between many of the 
ASEAN member states and Japan on the one hand, and China 
on the other.
The paper will be divided into two main sections.
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Following this introduction, Part II provides the setting 
against which the oil controversies (discussed in Part III) 
will be studied. Part II will consider the importance of 
offshore oil to East Asia, the legal background to offshore 
oil claims, and the political setting in East Asia from 
1969 to the present.
In Part III, case studies of offshore oil controversies 
in the East China Sea and the South China Sea will be 
examined in some detail. Attention will be paid to those 
aspects of the case studies which shed light on intra-regional 
political relations, particularly those involving China.
The short/concluding, Part IV will assess the degree 
to which the controversies detailed in Part III accurately 
reflect the major trends in recent East Asian political 
relations as outlined in the final section of Part II.
It should be stressed again that the object of this 
paper is to determine how a study of competing claims to 
offshore oil in East Asia might reveal major trends in 
intra-regional political relations. It is not intended 
here to describe in detail all the activities of the East 
Asian offshore oil industry. Statistics of offshore oil 
exploration and production; the effects of offshore oil 
development on the domestic politics of Asian countries; 
and the activities of foreign multinational oil companies, 
are only related where they are considered relevant to 
the main theme.
Footnotes
 ^ For a description of the various types of boundary 
disputes see J.R.V. Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers 
and Boundaries, Aldine Publishing Co., Chicaqo, 1965, 
pp.109-151.
7II. THE SETTING
The political significance of offshore oil controversies 
cannot, however, usefully be studied in a vacuum. First, 
it is helpful to determine the degree to which the 
possession of offshore oil is considered important by 
different countries. A country that has: a large demand
for oil, little domestic production, and a serious balance 
of payments deficit, might feel forced to adopt a stronger 
and more inflexible stand regarding offshore oil claims 
than other, more favoured, countries.
Second, it is necessary to have some familiarity 
with those sections of the law of the sea that relate 
to the possession and development of offshore areas 
believed rich in oil (and other mineral) resources. 
Invariably, a country's claim to sovereignty over some part 
of the ocean seabed will be based on that country's 
interpretation of the law of the sea. Unfortunately, 
the present ambiguities in marine law mean that there 
are often two or more countries claiming legal title to the 
same piece of seabed.
Third, it might be useful to outline the main trends 
in East Asian political relations during the past seven 
years or so. Once these trends have been defined it can 
be seen how closely they are paralleled by experiences in 
the case studies that follow in Part III.
The Importance of Offshore Oil to East Asia
Interest in the development of offshore oil among the 
countries of East Asia has greatly increased since the late
81960s. This growing interest has been prompted by: the
steeply rising cost of imported oil from the Middle East 
since late 1970 (and particularly since late 1973) 
which has aggravated these countries' balance of payments 
problems; growing domestic demand for oil by many East 
Asian states; recent surveys in Asian waters that suggest 
the presence of large reserves of oil; and improvements 
in offshore oil drilling technology that now make economic 
exploitation of these reserves more feasible.
The oil potential of the world's continental shelves 
and shallow ocean basins has long been recognised. These 
areas usually contain a greater thickness of marine Tertiary 
sediments from which most of the world's petroleum
]production comes than do the exposed parts of the continents.
James A. Crutchfield, writing in 1973,noted that 'Even
today, production of offshore oil is under way in the
waters of 22 countries, and more than 75 nations on five
continents are undertaking, or have granted permission to
undertake, exploration off their shores. Some 16 percent
of the world production of crude oil is now coming from
offshore sources and about 20 percent of the proved petroleum
2reserves are in these areas.'
East Asia has long been considered an area potentially 
rich in offshore oil. The region is favoured with large 
areas of continental shelves and small ocean basins. Data 
collected by L.G. Weeks in the mid-1960s gave further support 
to the view that the waters of Southeast Asia and the Far 
East contained some of the most promising areas in the world 
for offshore oil development (see Diagram 1).
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Despite these favourable estimates of East Asia's 
offshore oil potential, the countries of the region showed 
no urgency in laying claim to areas of the adjoining 
continental shelves. This may be explained in large 
measure by the fact that, until the late 1960s, offshore 
oil development was considered uneconomical in all but 
the most favoured situations. Oil drilling technology 
permitted only the exploitation of areas covered to a depth 
of 30 meters or so. Moreover, the cost of offshore oil 
production was generally so expensive when compared with 
that on land that only the largest offshore oil fields 
could induce the major international oil companies to 
invest the necessary large sums of money.
So long as the price of producing oil in the Middle 
East remained low there was little reason for the majors 
to develop offshore oil in East Asia. Moreover, the political 
climate for investment in the most attractive offshore 
area of Asia - the Indonesian archipelago - was less than 
enticing in the face of Sukarno's nationalist policies.
From the late 1960s, however, there has been much 
greater interest (both from within and from outside the 
region) in developing East Asia's offshore oil. This 
interest reached a peak, from which it las scarcely retreated, 
during the oil crisis of 1973/74.
It was a survey conducted in 1968/1969 by the Committee 
for Coordination of Offshore Prospecting (CCOP - an ECAFE- 
sponsored project) that made the countries of the region 
appreciate the potential value of the oil lying off their 
coasts. This survey assessed that oil in large quantities
11
lay in the whole sweeping offshore arch stretching from 
Burma to Japan.
Leon Howell and Michael Morrow asserted in 1970 
'a clutter of claims and predictions, statistics and
guesses, poured out on a slightly benumbed Southeast Asia.
3Euphoria reigned!' John Culbertson in Singapore Trade 
and Industry: 1972 declared that 'offshore tests have 
proved that the oil potential in Southeast Asia is greater 
than in other parts of the world.' The Straits Times 
of 11 July, 1970, quoted Mr Lawton Lawrence, managing 
director of Avery Lawrence, an American engineering firm, 
that 'Southeast Asia could become one of the world's 
five major oil-producing areas in the 1970s - rivalling 
the Persian Gulf.'
As the case studies will show, the release of the 
CCOP survey findings prompted a rash of claims to large 
areas of the South and East China Seas.
Another factor that contributed to the offshore boom 
was the development of suitable exploration, production, 
transportation and storage technology. By late 1971, 
for example, Shell Oil Co. had begun using Sedco 445 off 
Brunei. This equipment was capable of drilling in water 
depths up to 6,000 feet.
What gave greatest impetus to the development of 
East Asian offshore oil, however, was the increase in 
Middle Eastern oil prices that began their upward climb 
in late 1970. The price increases (together with the 
improved offshore oil technology) made many of the formerly
12
unattractive undersea areas of East Asia economic 
propositions.
By 1971, the bargaining strength of OPEC and the
deteriorating situation in the world oil demand/supply
equation had led to what Malcolm Caldwell has described
as a 'frantic search for oil ... being conducted round the
globe by the oil companies, the governments of the consumer
countries, and by international agencies such as ECAFE on 
4their behalf.' Caldwell estimated that much of the almost 
$7.25 billion a year the oil industry was spending in its 
search for more petroleum reserves was spent in East Asia.~*
Most of the countries of the region were eager to 
let the major oil companies explore for oil off their
*
coasts. The offshore oil boom promised rich rewards for 
the host country - or at least for some sections of the 
host community. First, some of the oil produced might be 
retained for use by the host's industrial sector, thus 
reducing the need to pay scarce foreign currency for 
imported oil. Second, the royalties and taxes gained by 
exporting offshore oil would help to offset the large 
balance of trade problems faced by most countries of the 
region. Third, even should offshore exploration activities 
fail to find oil in commercial quantities the host country 
still stood to gain through the sale of offshore concessions 
and the provision of ancillary services.
Even some of those countries less favoured in terms 
of offshore oil potential could still benefit from the boom. 
Singapore, a shelf-locked state, realised that as a major
13
regional maritime, industrial and refining center, it 
could hope to receive more than its share of the foreign 
money being invested in East Asian undersea oil.
And the money promised to flow in large quantities. 
Caldwell claims that early in 1970 the Chase Manhattan 
Bank's Chairman, David Rockefeller, 'whetted the appetites 
of all the Asian businessmen and financiers present 
/at an Asian financial forum held in Singapore/ by predicting 
a capital investment of $35 billion by oil companies in 
Asia and the Western Pacific over the next 12 years - 
most of it in Southeast Asia.'
The promised lavish spending attracted the attention 
of many of the region's political elites. A rivalry 
developed among many East Asian countries to attract •* 
foreign oil company investment. The national elites in 
some Southeast Asian nations (most notably in Suharto's 
Indonesia, and in Thieu's South Vietnam) hoped to channel 
some of the investment funds into their pockets. Howell 
and Morrow assert 'Governments quickly acquire dependency 
on oil revenues for their budgets and interest groups for
7their wealth, status, and power.'
Japan, the region's greatest oil consumer, stood 
to gain much from the offshore all boom. First the Japanese 
hoped to develop oil from their own continental shelves 
(more on this in Part III). Second, they hoped that 
Japanese oil development companies would join in the 
search for oil in waters elsewhere in East Asia. Oil 
coming from East Asian sources had several advantages for
14
the Japanese: Southeast Asian oil had a generally lower
sulphur content than Middle Eastern oil; transport 
costs were lower for East Asian oil; and even politically 
troubled East Asia seemed a better security bet than the 
unstable Middle East.
All these factors had the desired effect, and by 
late 1973 the great carve-up of offshore areas into oil 
concessions was well advanced. (See Diagrams 2 and 3.)
The rush for East Asian offshore oil reached a new
high, bordering on hysteria, following the oil crisis
of late 1973. All the reasons for interest in the region's
undersea oil development now applied with greater force.
The sheer magnitude of the price increases in Middle
Eastern oil posed a serious problem for most countries 
8of the region. Not only had the price of oil imports 
risen by some 300 percent, but the prices of imports 
(such as fertilisers) from the industrialised countries 
threatened to rise steeply. The development of indigenous 
oil now seemed more urgent as an earner of valuable 
foreign exchange, which could be used to import needed 
capital for development.
The major oil companies were only too eager to 
accept the invitation to participate in offshore oil 
development in East Asia. The majors were determined 
to find alternative oil fields outside the Middle East.
As Michael Morrow puts it 'The rush to Southeast Asia 
has been, in part, the rush of major companies to gain 
leverage in relationships with Middle East producing 
countries. Non-Arab producers cannot be held together
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by Arab nationalism or anti-Zionism. 9
There are other good reasons why the majors are 
attracted to the region. The new level of oil prices 
set by OPEC has helped to make the development of East 
Asian offshore oil more of an economically viable 
proposition. The Far Eastern Economic Review has noted 
that 'in general, higher crude prices have brought oil 
companies flocking to the continental shelves and coastal 
plains'of Asia .... It was estimated that US companies 
alone will invest $566 million in Indonesia during 1975 
(up from $319 million in 1974) and $192 million elsewhere 
in the Far East excluding Japan. Every country along the 
Asian rim has offshore exploration planned or in progress - 
except for Sri Lanka and Pakistan, which have onshore 
drilling in progress, and North Korea whose plans are 
unknown.'^
By the end of 1975, the surge of exploration for 
offshore oil that had followed the 1973/74 energy crisis 
had tapered off somewhat. This reflected in part the 
stagnant demand for oil in the industrialised world - 
particularly in Japan. However, there is little doubt 
that interest in developing the undersea oil wealth of 
the region remains at a far higher level than that prevailing 
before October, 1973. And so long as OPEC continues to 
charge such high prices for its oil, this interest in East 
Asian offshore oil will continue.
18
The degree of interest shown in offshore oil development 
in East Asia has, therefore, three distinct phases. Phase 
one covers the period up to the late 1960s, when interest 
was at a relatively low level. Drilling technology was 
then still so backward to permit exploitation of only the 
most favoured offshore sites - for example in the shallow 
waters off Borneo. As the price of Middle East oil was 
then a mere US$1.80 a barrel few, if any, offshore fields 
could compete in price.
Phase two lasted from about 1969 to late 1973, 
and can be considered to be a period of moderate/high interest. 
Offshore oil production technology had made great advances 
and permitted drilling in much deeper water. This was 
also a period marked by rising world oil prices that 
made the exploitation of offshore oil (in East Asia and 
elsewhere in the world) economically more attractive.
Phase three dates from late 1973 to the present, when 
interest in offshore oil development in East Asia reached 
new peaks. A quadrupling of the price of Persian Gulf oil 
threatened serious balance of payments problems.
The Legal Background to Offshore Oil Claims
In recognition of the growing importance of offshore 
oil, the countries of East Asia have been eager to lay 
claim to sovereignty over waters off their coasts. Naturally, 
these countries have tried to ensure that their claims 
are supported in international law. Unfortunately, the 
law of the sea is most ambiguous on the subject of ownership 
of resources of the seabed and subsoil of the continental
.* 19
shelf - where lies the commercially attractive reserves 
of offshore oil. In order to give greater meaning to 
the East Asian oil controversies considered in Part III 
it might be useful first to outline these legal ambiguities.
The debate over the right of dominion over the sea
and its resources has a long history. Much of the doctrine
of maritime order as we now know it was conceived by
the great seventeenth century Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius
who asserted that the ocean must be held free for common
use. The 'boundless ocean', Grotius argued,'was indivisible,
open and intangible - its natural resources were infinite.
But, as Seyom Brown reminds us, Grotius' advocacy of
freedom of the seas was challenged by the British jurist
John Seiden who believed 'The right of dominion gave nations
the right to exclude others from claimed portions of the
sea, to prevent fishing, navigating, landing and "taking 
11of gems".' Seiden argued that the sea's resources 
were exhaustible, its space could be divided, and its 
uses could be effectively controlled.
For much of the past three and a half centuries it
was Grotius' doctrine of freedom of the seas that was
12accepted as the standard in international law. With 
few exceptions, the resources of the sea did appear to 
be inexhaustible. Moreover, in some cases - as, for 
example, underwater oil - they were incapable of being 
exploited.
• •
However, technological and political developments 
in the middle of this century began to undermine the freedom
Jt 20
of the seas doctrine. The first real blow came in
September, 1945, when President Truman proclaimed that
the United States regarded 'the natural resources of the
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United
States as appertaining to the United States, subject to
13its jurisdiction and control.' The Declaration was 
largely the result of strong pressures by the American 
petroleum industry which wanted exclusive rights to 
exploit hydrocarbons in offshore areas.
Comparable claims by other states followed. Unilateral 
bids were made by a number of states to the living and 
mineral resources off their coasts. For example, Chile,
Ecuador and Peru extended exclusive rights to fisheries 
as well as the ocean floor out to 200 miles. Kim Traavik 
remarks 'The Truman Declaration in effect constituted 
the opening of a legal Pandora's box. Today practically 
all coastal states ... have put forward claims to national 
shelf areas of greatly differing sizes.'^
These unilateral claims over the living and mineral
resources of very large areas of the world's oceans raised
the prospects of what C.D.Beeby has described as 'a new
variety of colonial scramble involving international tensions
15and even the possibility of open conflict among states.'
In recognition of this threat, the United Nations 
in 1958 convened a conference in Geneva in an attempt to 
clarify the law of the sea. One cf the four treaties to 
emerge from the conference was the Convention on the Continental
21
Shelf. The Convention recognised that a coastal state
had sovereign and exclusive rights to the resources of
16its continental shelf. It defined the continental 
shelf as:
(a) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the 
area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 
200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where 
the depth of the superjacent waters admits 
of the exploitation of the natural resources 
of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and 
similar submarine areas adjacent to the 
coasts of islands.
It was the ambiguous quality of this Article 1 of the 
Convention that was responsible for much of the subsequent 
confusion with respect to sovereignty over offshore oil 
claims. The Convention failed to produce an adequate 
definition of the outer limit of the area in which 
'sovereign and exclusive' rights might be exercised.
It was evident that the International Law Commission
that had been responsible for preparatory work done on
the Convention recognised that the legal continental
18shelf might extend beyond the geological shelf. But 
the 'exploitability' criterion left open the possibility 
that claims to areas of the seabed would move progressively 
seawards with the advance of technology. As Kim Traavik 
notes 'carried to its logical extreme, the criterion of 
possible exploitation could in effect be taken to mean 
that the shelf zone of a coastal state need no other 
delimitation than some other coastal state's seabed area.... 
In theory, and by way of example, one might thus visualise 
that the countries on each side of the Atlantic Ocean
partitioned its seabed between them along the median line.'19
22
The use of the word 'adjacent' in Article 1 also 
creates problems in defining the outer limits of sovereignty. 
Several jurisdictional disputes have arisen concerning 
'interrupted' shelves where shallow areas lie beyond 
the first 200-meter isobath seaward from the coast. Does 
the presence of deep submarine canyons disqualify the 
'outlying' shallow areas from inclusion within the 
shelf regime? Article 1 does not provide a clear answer.
Another serious problem is the provisions the 
Convention made for dividing up the continental shelf that 
is shared by two or more nations. Article 6 of the 
Convention states in part:
1. Where the same continental shelf 
is adjacent to the territories of two or 
more States whose coasts are opposite each 
other, the boundary of the continental shelf 
appertaining to such States shall be determined 
by agreement between them. In the absence of 
agreement, and unless another boundary line
is justified by special circumstances, the 
boundary is the median line, every point of 
which is equidistant from the nearest points 
of the baselines from which the kreadth of the 
territorial sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is 
adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, 
the boundary of the continental shelf shall be 
determined by agreement between them. In the 
absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, 
the boundary shall be determined by application 
of the principle of equidistance from the 
nearest points of the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea of each 
State is measured.20
The qualification in paragraph 2 concerning 'special 
circumstances' can be given various interpretations. This 
qualification, Stan Ross has noted 'may refer to the 
physical characteristics of the area, to the existence of
23
a navigable channel, or it may refer to the distribution
of the resources of the sea-bed or subsoil. Moreover,
the Convention does not indicate whether any notion of
21equitable apportionment should he considered.’
The equidistant rule, and the special circumstances
qualification, were central to the North Sea Continental
Shelf dispute between West Germany and Denmark, and West
Germany and Holland in the late 1960s. Under the equidistant
rule, West Germany would have received sovereignty over
only a very small part of the North Sea (which has large
oil deposits). The International Court decided that this
rule was but one of several equitable principles that
should be applied in determining the division of the
continental shelf. The Court ruled that the continental^
shelf must be the 'natural prolongation of land territory
and must not encroach upon what is the natural prolongation
22of the territory of another state.'
The ambiguities inherent in the 'exploitability' , 
'adjacency', and 'special circumstances' criteria in the 
Convention have made difficult the orderly development 
of offshore resources at a time when global interest in 
the development of resources in and under the sea 
(particularly oil) has reached new peaks.
In recognition of this urgent and growing problem, 
there have been several further attempts to establish some 
kind of national order for the exploitation of ocean 
resources. Conferences on the law of the sea held in 
Caracas (from June to August 1974) and in Geneva (from
2 4
March to May 1975) reached no final agreement, but progress
was made towards solving some of the problems. There
was substantial support for the proposal that a 200-mile
economic zone and a 12-mile territorial sea be adopted.
(Australia, the Soviet Union, Britain, and most of the
developing states of Asia, Africa and Latin American supported
2 3this concept.) The prevailing view was that coastal 
states should have total control over the resources 
within the economic zone.
Naturally, the landlocked and geographically 
disadvantaged countries have been hesitant about endorsing 
a 200-mile economic zone. They are still more reluctant 
to accept an even broader coastal state jurisdiction over 
seabed resources. About 45 states have proposed that 
coastal nations should have jurisdiction over the whole 
of the continental shelf - even where it extends beyond 
the 200-mile economic zone. This group of countries 
refers to the decision of the International Court of 
Justice in respect of the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases which granted to the coastal states sovereign rights 
over the seabed resources of -the whole of the natural 
prolongation of their land territory to the outer edge 
of the continental margin.
The present Law of the Sea Conference being held 
in New York will - among its many other responsibilities - 
address itself to the problem of the 200-mile economic 
zone. It will also attempt to resolve other issues 
relevant to sovereignty over non-living marine resources. 
Among these are: the rights of islands - for example, do
small, uninhabited islands, far from the mainland, generate
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a 200-mile economic zone?; and the role and powers of' 
an international agency to be established having control 
over the exploitation of resources beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction.
Despite the ambiguities in the law of the sea a
state of complete anarchy does not exist regarding claims
to sovereignty over resources of the seabed and subsoil
thereof. Some states have made use of the provisions
for mutual agreement laid down in Article 6 of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf. As of mid-1973
there were 19 bilateral agreements governing the boundaries
24between national claims to submarine areas.
The Political Setting in East Asia Since 1969
Before treating with the case studies it is necessary 
to outline major recent developments in East Asian 
political relations. It is against this background that 
the political implications of the controversies over 
offshore oil claims in the region detailed in Part III 
will be measured and assessed. Emphasis throughout this 
section will be given to the fluctuating political 
relationships the countries of the region have had with 
the largest regional power - China. The period covered 
will be from 1969 to the present. These were the years 
when disputes over areas of the East and South China 
Seas believed rich in oil first arose.
This short sketch will note that, with some exceptions, 
there has been a marked change in the character of the 
relationship these countries have had with China. Where 
in 1969 these relationships were usually marked by great
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suspicion and varying degrees of hostility, they are now 
typified by a relatively more relaxed and cooperative 
atmosphere.
In late 1969, Peking looked out on a generally 
hostile East Asia. China had just emerged from the 
Cultural Revolution during which it had given strong vocal 
support to revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia.
China then seemed surrounded by enemies. South Korea,
Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, South 
Vietnam and Thailand all had American military bases.
To the south lay Indonesia and Burma, and, to the west of 
the region, India - countries antagonistic to Peking.
And, of course, there was the feared enemy to the north, 
the Soviet Union.
Most of the non-communist countries of the region 
had some sort of security pact with the United States.
It is true that in July, 1969, President Nixon had 
expounded his 'Guam Doctrine' of gradual military 
disengagement from the Asian mainland. But while America's 
allies were expected to shoulder more of the burden of 
their own defense, the USA still remained deeply involved 
in Asia. The Doctrine made it plain that Washington would 
continue to provide its Asian friends with both military 
and economic assistance. In the wake of the Tet offensive 
of 1968, American policy had shifted from one of direct 
involvement in the region to onec£ indirect - but still 
substantial - intervention.
Peking might, in 1969, have been justified in believing 
that most of its Asian neighbours were collaborating in 
an American policy of containing China.
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The Chinese viewed Japan as the greatest regional
threat to their long-term security. The Nixon-Sato
Communique of that year had stated that 'Japan's security
is directly related to the security of South Korea and
to the Taiwan Straits.' Peking feared that militarism
had firmly re-established itself in Japan and that the
continuing US-Japan Security Treaty (renewed in 1970)
was a military alliance against China and North Korea.
Japan was, in fact, thought to be taking over part of
the American security role in the Pacific. Derek Davies
saw Chou En-lai's visit to Pyongyang in April 1970 as
laying 'the foundations for a basically anti-Tokyo
25Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi axis.' There was‘little doubt 
that Japan had now joined the Soviet Union and the United 
States in China's list of most feared and hated enemies.^
Despite (or perhaps in part because of) Peking's 
increased hostility towards Tokyo, China in late 1969/early 
1970 made a dramatic return to 'reasonable and pragmatic' 
foreign policies. It was probably the armed clashes 
with Soviet troops at the Ussuri River, together with 
the threatening Nixon-Sato Communique that served to remind 
Peking of its position of isolation and prompted the 
Chinese to mend their diplomatic fences with the Third World.
China's new smiling face was welcomed by some of the
countries of East Asia which were then carefully assessing
the full implications of the Guam Doctrine. Thailand's
Thanat Khoman had already put out a feeler to Peking when
in the spring of 1969 he called on 'non-communist Asia to
2 6close ranks and induce China to "work with us."'
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The process of normalisation in China's relations" 
with other East Asian countries has been fitful. Somewhat 
ironically, the speed with which Peking repaired its 
relations with Tokyo and Washington - two of the former 
arch enemies - was initially much greater than that with 
the countries of Southeast Asia.
It was Nixon's visit to Peking in February, 1972, 
followed by that of Tanaka seven months later, that 
marked the era of detente among the great powers. Many 
East Asian countries then began to feel a more pressing 
need to normalise diplomatic relations with Peking.
However, it was not until 1974 that any marked progress 
was made in that direction. In the spring of that year, 
Malaysia became the first ASEAN member to announce the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking. Also 
that year, Imelda Marcos visited Peking, and the new government 
in Bangkok sent several delegations to the Chinese capital.
Sino-Japanese relations continued to improve in 1974.
The first shipments of Chinese oil (if only in small
quantities) were beginning to arrive in energy-short Japan.
More significantly,, perhaps, on 20 April the Sino-Japanese
Aviation Agreement was finally signed, after what Hong
N. Kim has described as 'seventeen long months of arduous
27and hectic negotiations.'
It was the events of April last year that precipitated 
a new flurry of diplomatic negotiations. The fall of 
Saigon and Phnom Penh, and the subsequent emergence of a 
pro-communist regime in Vientiane, served to shatter the 
region's already shaky confidence in Washington's desire
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and/or ability to protect them from 'the communist threat'.
Throughout East Asia, national leaders were wondering
whether American security guarantees were now worth very
much. As John Girling put it, there has been a realignment
of policies among many Southeast Asian states with a
’...dramatic shift from alliance wilh the United States to
a form of non-alignment, including friendly relations
with China, and from dependence on military commitments
2 8to reliance on diplomacy and indeed self-reliance.'
The non-communist countries of the region discounted
collective defence as a viable option for meeting the new
situation. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)
finally folded up in 1975. And, while the ASEAN states
of Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore moved tentatively closer 'there was little
chance (or hope) of presenting a united, military front
to the new Vietnam. The accent was on appeasement, not 
29confrontation.'
Some East Asian states were more eager than others 
to improve their relationship with China. Following 
Malaysia's example the previous year, in 1975 two other 
members of ASEAN - Thailand and the Philippines - established 
diplomatic links with China. Bangkok no doubt felt that 
closer relations with Peking would give Thailand some 
measure of protection against an enlarged communist Vietnam. 
It was not long after the fall of Saigon that the Thai 
Prime Minister ordered the withdrawal of 27,000 US servicemen 
stationed on five US-used bases by 17 March, 1976. Manila 
also had second thoughts about the two major US bases on
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Filipino territory. President Marcos now viewed these 
bases and the Mutual Security Treaty with the United 
States as net liabilities.
The debacle in Vietnam also created doubts in 
Japanese minds about the reality of the American defence 
commitment should Japan be threatened. While the Japanese 
still realised they had little choice but to retain their 
defence links with the USA, they also felt it wise to 
strengthen their links with China. Sino-Japanese trade 
increased by 50 percent in the first six months of 1975 
and there were hints that China might become a future 
major alternative source of oil.
But there was a limit beyond which the Japanese 
were not prepared to go in appeasing Peking. Tokyo ^
showed its reluctance to sign a Treaty of Friendship 
with China which contained a clause condemning 'hegemony- 
seeking' in East Asia by any country. Suspicious as the 
Japanese are of the Soviet Union, they are still anxious 
not to offend Moscow - the obvious target of the 'hegemony' 
clause.
The Sino-Soviet dispute explains in large part China's 
desire to reciprocate the cordial approaches of its Asian 
neighbours. Peking fears that the USSR will fill the 
vacuum left by America's withdrawal from the Asian mainland
Not all countries of East Asia, however, were eager 
to make the pilgrimage to Peking. Singapore showed itself 
prepared to develop more cordial relations with China but 
not to the point of establishing diplomatic links.
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Other, more conservative, regimes in East Asia were 
severely shaken by the fall of Saigon. Taipei and Seoul 
saw the 'loss' of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos as but the 
most recent and strongest example of the growing weakness 
of American resolve to stem communist expansionism. Events 
in Indochina made Chiang Ching-kuo and Park Chung Hee even 
more determined to bolster their defences against their 
communist neighbours. Nor were things much different in 
Indonesier * The bitterly anti-communistcpnerals ruling 
that country were little more favourably disposed towards 
China than their brothers in Taiwan and South Korea.
Neither were the victors in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City 
and Vientiane much more favourably disposed towards 
China. During the last years of the Indochina war friction 
had developed between Hanoi and Peking. North Vietnam 
had long been worried how it might hope to maintain true 
independence from China. Most senior communists in 
Indochina, therefore, value their links with Moscow as 
a guarantee of their countries' political autonomy.
Even those countries anxious to improve their 
relations with Peking have not necessarily ceased to be 
less suspicious of the Chinese. The Thais and Malaysians, 
in particular, realise that whilst China is prepared to 
strengthen links with them on a state-to-state level,
Peking still has an ideological commitment to supporting 
revolutionary wars of liberation. The Chinese, however, 
have been careful in recent years not to give more than 
weak/moderate verbal support to insurgent movements in 
Southeast Asia. Peking values its new links with the region
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too much to risk driving these governments into the arms 
of Moscow. (It is China's fear of the USSR that also 
explains why Peking is not averse to the USA maintaining 
bases on the Asian mainland.)
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III. OFFSHORE OIL CONTROVERSIES IN EAST ASIA
Part III of this paper examines in detail the 
controversies over offshore oil claims in East Asia.
These disputes will be evaluated for the light they shed 
on intra-regional political relationships over the past 
seven years. As Peking's relationship with the countries 
of East Asia is of central interest, emphasis will be 
given to those controversies in which China is one of 
the disputants.
For the sake of convenience, Part III will be 
divided into two sections. Section one considers 
offshore oil disputes in the East China Sea, particularly 
that between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands.
Section two treats with offshore all claims in the South 
China Sea involving China, the two Vietnams, the Philippines, 
and others.
East China Sea
The littoral states bordering on the East China 
and Yellow Seas have created a complex web of competing 
claims to offshore areas believed rich in oil. Taiwan 
contests claims by China and Japan; South Korea is in 
dispute with Japan, China and North Korea; North Korea 
challenges South Korea and Japan; China disputes claims 
by all its non-communist neighbours (and, some say, disputes 
claims by North Korea);^  and Japan is involved in offshore 
disputes with all its neighbours.
Some of these controversies - for example, that 
between the two Koreas, and that between the two Chinas -
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have been quite predictable and contribute little extra 
to our understanding of Far Eastern political relations.
Other controversies, however, are of greater interest to 
the student of international relations. Especially 
interesting are those disputes between nations whose 
mutual political relationships are uncertain or which 
are in the process of great change. The dispute between 
Japan and China, involving sovereignty over parts of 
the East China Sea, is one such case and provides the 
focus of this section.
The following case study will demonstrate how 
the course of the debate between China and.Japan closely 
parallels the wider political debate between the two 
countries. The years 1969 to 1971 were marked by 
intransigence and hostility - especially on the part of 
China. More recently, however, there has been an increasing 
desire by both parties to reach some sort of accommodation.
As noted in Part II, the 1968/69 CCOP survey confirmed
the long-held suspicion that the continental shelves and
ocean basins of the Far East had great potential for offshore
oil development. Shortly after the survey, the US Navy's
Oceanographic Office was quoted as saying that '"potentially
one of the most prolific reserves in the world" has been
discovered in the East China and Yellow Seas near Japan,
2Taiwan and Korea....' World Oil magazine claimed that 
the most promising area extends along three ridges on the 
continental shelf between China and the Ryukyu Islands in 
the East China Sea .... Should exploratory drilling prove 
the U.S. Navy correct, nearby nations no longer will have to
3depend on imports from Indonesia and the Middle East.'
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These estimates could well prove wildly over- 
optimistic. But what is significant, as far as the 
present discussion is concerned, is that the countries 
of the area believed that such potential existed. As 
recently as January, 1975, the New China News Agency 
was quoted as claiming that 'oil resources in the Yellow 
Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea, if fully exploited, 
together with 80 existing oil fields, will “place the 
country /China/ ahead of any oil producing nation in the 
world."'4
The CCOP survey was conducted some five years before 
the oil crisis of late 1973 and two years before OPEC 
announced the first of many increases in the price of 
crude oil. This is not to suggest, however, that the 
survey's findings were not welcomed in East Asian capitals. 
Japan (the world's largest importer of oil since 1966), 
Taiwan, and South Korea, all found their high dependence 
on imported oil a burden. As noted in Part II, domestically 
produced oil would have two great attractions: the
source of supply would be politically secure, and there would 
be great savings in,foreign currency.
China was in a more fortunate position than the others. 
Since the mid-1960s the People's Republic had been a net 
exporter of oil. But Peking was no less interested in 
developing offshore crude, for such oil could be exported 
and would provide a welcome additional source of foreign 
currency for China's programme of industrial development.
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All these countries were, therefore, anxious to lay 
claim to as large an area of theafflying seabed as possible.
Even before the results of the CCOP survey were made 
public, the South Korean government granted a concession 
contract (in April, 1969) to Gulf Oil Company to explore 
and exploit offshore areas. On 1 January, 1970, the 
Submarine Mineral Resources Development Law was promulgated.
A Presidential decree of 30 May, 1970, outlined the 
dimensions of seven seabed mining blocks off the Korean 
coast. -(See Diagram 3 above)
The Taiwanese government also acted quickly, and on 
17 July, 1969, took the first of several legal steps 
toward claiming sovereignty over a large area of the offlying 
continental shelf. In October that year Taipei established 
five 'seabed reserve areas.'
The Japanese government was less eager than those in 
Seoul and Taipei to involve itself legally in this issue.
Tokyo did, however, in October and November, 1970, defend 
the interests of four Japanese oil companies which had 
applied for mining rights to four offshore blocks that were 
disputed by Taiwan and South Korea. Moreover, the Japanese 
government had in July that year challenged Taiwan's right 
to sign a contract with Gulf Oil Co. for the exploration 
and exploitation of oil resources in an area to the northeast 
of Taiwan. This area included the entire Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands 
(known to the Japanese as the Senkaku Islands) which Tokyo 
claimed belonged to the Ryukyus and, therefore, to Japan.
So, by late 1970, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea had 
each established unilaterally a boundary limit vis-a-vis the
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state opposite. These unilateral claims overlapped in 
places. Out of the 17 seabed blocks which were designated 
by the three countries, only four were uncontested (see 
Diagram 3).
Not one of the three countries proposed to seek 
an agreement over the problem of boundary delimitation.
Instead, it was suggested in July, 1970, that Japanese,
South Korean and Taiwanese business interests should 
jointly develop the continental shelves. The problems 
of jurisdiction and boundary delimitation could be frozen 
and resolved at a later date.
Until then China had remained silent over the subject 
of offshore oil claims. But on 4 December, 1970, Peking 
made a strong protest against the actions of its three j 
neighbours. The Peking Review attacked 'The Japanese 
militarists / who_7 have adopted a series of new and more 
vicious tricks for the purpose of plundering the undersea 
oil of China and Korea.' The article went on to warn that 
'US imperialism, aggressive by nature, long ago stretched 
its claws of aggression on to the sea floor of China's 
vast shallow water areas....The US and Japanese reactionaries 
will reap their own bitter fruits if they do not pull in
5their claws of aggression.'
China was clearly incensedty Japanese, Taiwanese 
and South Korean attempts to develop oil on what Peking 
viewed its continental shelf. China lost no time in 
claiming sovereign rights over the resources of the continental 
shelves lying off its coasts, and ownership of the Tiao-yu-t'ai
Islands.
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It might be useful at this juncture to outline the 
various legal claims made with respect to parts of the 
East China Sea. Each state has insisted that only its 
claims are tenable under international law. But, as 
noted above, the law of the sea is very ambiguous in 
matters involving delineation of continental shelf 
boundaries. Many of these ambiguities and weaknesses 
crop up in the East China Sea controversies, and have 
made legal resolution of the disputes difficult or 
impossible.
Naturally, each country interprets the law of the 
sea to suit its own national interests.
Choon-Ho Park has noted that China's claims to 
jurisdiction over the sea resources in the Yellow and ^g
East China Seas 'have been basically unspecific.' However,
it is not too difficult to determine the main outlines
of China's stand on law of the sea matters affecting offshore
resources. China has long supported the basically Third
World position that coastal states should have sovereignty
over large areas of the offlying oceans. The Peking Review
put China's position in somewhat vague terms. 'We maintain
that all coastal countries have the right of disposal of
their natural resources in their coastal seas, seabed and
the subsoil thereof so as to promote the well-being of
their people and the development of their national economic 
7interests.'
China has been somewhat more specific regarding offshore 
claims in the East China, South China, and Yellow Seas.
China clearly embraces the 'natural prolongation of land
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territory principle' which had been the basis of the 1969 
International Court of Justice judgement in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf cases. The natural prolongation 
principle is advantageous to China as the continental 
shelf inclines gently from the mainland of China and 
drops abruptly into a deep trench - the Okinawa Trough - 
off the southwest coast c£ Japan. Peking argues that 
that part of the continental shelf lying to the west of 
the Okinawa Trough belongs to China. (See Diagram 4.)
Peking is also sensitive about the legal status 
of the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands in the knowledge that, 
should Japan win legal title to them, China could lose 
sovereignty over a potentially oil rich part of the shelf.
But China's claim to the offlying continental shelft 
in the East China Sea has been somewhat undermined by 
its support for a 200-mile economic zone at Caracas and 
at subsequent law of the sea conferences. As we shall 
note later, it is difficult to apply the 200-mile economic 
zone concept without also applying the median line 
principle for defining boundaries between coastal states 
less than 400 miles apart. Peking's support for a 200-mile 
economic zone, therefore, undermines its 'naturalgprolongation* position.
Taiwan's claims are based largely on the same legal 
arguments as those of Peking. Taipei asserts that its 
ownership of large areas of the East China Sea are based 
on the 'natural prolongation' argument. As William 
Hartley points out 'The extensive claims, of course, are
based on Taiwan's insistence of sovereignty over the
,9Chinese mainland.
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Japan, as a major maritime and fishing nation, was 
opposed to broad zones of national jurisdiction over offshore 
waters. However, as the world's largest importer of oil, 
Japan was naturally anxious that, if a carve-up of the 
globe's continental shelves was inevitable, it would 
claim ownership of as large a portion of the East China 
Sea as possible. Japan realised that, given the nature 
of the topography of the offlying seabed, its national 
interests were best served by adopting the solution in 
the 1958 Convention suggesting that the continental shelf 
between two countries should be divided along the median 
line - the equidistant principle. Japan's legal argument 
is that the Okinawa Trough should be ignored, and the 
median line principle applied so that large areas lying 
to the west of the Trough could be claimed as Japanese.
The Japanese have also been anxious to claim ownership 
of the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands (the Senkakus). Tokyo argues: 
one, that these islands do, in fact, belong to Japan and, 
two, that they should be used as base points for the 
measurement of the median line vis-a-vis China (or Taiwan).10 
(See Diagram 4.) Japan also takes a similar stand with 
respect to the small, uninhabited islands of Danjo Gunto 
and Tori Shima, lying between Japan and South Korea.
The South Koreans have taken a legal position that 
is a hybrid of both the Chinese and the Japanese approaches. 
Blocks 1, 2 and 3 in the Yellow Sea and Block 4 in the 
East China Sea are delimited according to the median-line 
principle. Block 7 seems to have been delimited under the 
'natural prolongation' formula.
From the legal debate the discussion returns to 
the political controversy over offshore oil claims in 
the East China Sea. Again emphasis will be given to 
the dispute between China and Japan.
The Japanese were both surprised and dismayed by 
the strength of China's protest of December, 1970.
Peking's displeasure was registered again in March, 1971, 
in a joint communique issued in the Chinese capital at 
the conclusion of the annual Sino-Japanese memorandum 
trade talks. Park notes that two paragraphs in it referred 
to 'the attempt by Japan, Korea, and Taiwan to develop 
jointly the continental shelf resources of the Yellow Sea 
and the East China Sea. This plan ... constituted an 
overt encroachment on the sovereignty of China and y
would not be tolerated.'^
The Japanese reacted quickly to the Chinese protests. 
Once the United States Department of State (which was 
then working for detente between Peking and Washington) 
advised American oil companies not to explore for oil in 
the waters of the East China Sea, Japan followed suit.
While anxious not to antagonise Peking unduly, Tokyo
still took a strong stand over its claim to the Senkaku
Islands. Prime Minister Sato was quoted as saying at a
meeting of the Budget Committee of the Upper House of the
Diet on 9 November 1971, that 'the Senkakus were "the
territory-of Japan and the issue should not be meddled in
by the Chinese." Mr Sato rejected an idea ... that the
Japanese Government should hold talks with the Chinese
12over claims to the Senkaku Islands.' Early in 1972 the
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Japanese government was reported to be irritated by
Washington's 'evasive position' on the Senkaku Islands.
(The United States - which had just re-established
diplomatic links with China - had in March stated that
it took a neutral position over the Japanese/Chinese
13claim to the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands. )
Following Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Peking 
in September that year, however, the Japanese position 
over the Senkakus softened noticeably. Obviously the 
Japanese government was not prepared to let squabbles 
over offshore oil claims jeopardise their growing 
political (and economic) links with the Chinese.
A hint of the new mood could be detected in Yasuhiro
Nakasone's (then Minister of International Trade and f
Industry) warning to Japanese oil companies of March,
1973, that his Ministry would not permit oil development
in the area until the controversy over territorial claims
14to the Senkakus was settled.
By mid-1973, other observers were noting that, in
the wake of the Sino-US and Sino-Japanese detente, disputes
over the control of the potentially oil-rich underwater
15resources in the East China Sea had quietened.
At the height of the oil crisis of late 1973/early 
1974 there was a danger that this new, less antagonistic, 
mood might be shattered. Faced by oil supply shortages 
and sharply increased prices of oil, Japan and South Korea 
entered into an agreement in January, 1974, for the joint 
development of oil in areas where offshore claims by the 
two countries overlapped. The boundary issue was to be 
suspended for future negotiation.
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Only five days after .the Japanese-Korean agreement 
was signed Peking registered its protest. The Chinese 
held that ’according to the principle that the continental 
shelf is the natural extension of the continent, it 
stands to reason that the question of how to divide 
the continental shelf in the Ehst China Sea should be 
divided by China and the other countries concerned through 
consultations.'^
Compared with China's protest of 4 December, 1970, 
this statement was much milder in tone. Moreover, it 
showed that Peking was not totally inflexible,for China 
had declared its willingness to consult with the other 
coastal states over shelf boundaries.
The Japanese must have been relieved that the Chinese
protest was not as strong as it might have been. Once the
worst of the oil crisis was over (by March, 1974) the
Japanese moved to rectify some of the damage caused by
the hastily concluded agreement with South Korea. As
early as March, 1974, the Korean Times was reporting that
the Japanese government might be dragging its feet over
ratification of the agreement in the Diet for fear of
'unfavourable consequences which might affect the Sino-
17Japanese relationship.' As of December, 1975, ratification 
had still not been approved by Tokyo.
Choon-Ho Park, however, believes that fear of China's 
reaction might explain in part Tokyo's slowness to ratify, 
but he believes there might have been other reasons. Japan 
might, he suggests, feel that it is best to wait for the 
outcome of the current Third Law of the Sea Conference
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especially with respect to the 200-mile economic zone
proposals. The 200-mile zone might, in fact, give Japan
a bigger share of the East China Sea presently in dispute
18with South Korea.
The present writer suspects that Japan never wanted
to conclude a joint oil development agreement with South
Korea - not, at least, at the risk of severely offending
China. The Japanese only entered into the agreement as
a result of panic at the height of the oil crisis. It
had then seemed that the Japanese economy would grind
19to a halt for lack of oil. When, in spring 1974, it 
was obvious that oil supplies would soon return to normal 
levels (if at a very high price) the Japanese quickly 
dropped interest in developing such politically sensitive
V
areas as the East China Sea.
In its end of year assessment, the Far Eastern
Economic Review detected a movement in 1975 towards closer
cooperation between China and Japan in offshore oil
exploration in the East China Sea. The Review believed
that some de facto if not de jure understanding over
2 0shelf conflicts is -increasingly possible.
The more cooperative attitude presently existing
between China and Japan with respect to East China Sea
oil should, therefore, be viewed against the wider political
background. Unlike the period before 1972 which was
marked by hostility, recently there has been a desire by
both countries to strengthen their relationship. China's
determination to wean Tokyo away from the Soviet Union has
been evidenced by increased exports of Taching crude oil 
21to Japan.
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In their turn the Japanese are anxious to cultivate 
their links with Peking. The multipolar world ushered in 
by Nixon's visit to Peking seems, in fact, to demand it. 
Further, the uncertain political climate existing in East 
Asia; the slow progress of detente with Moscow; the age- 
old attraction of the China market; and the more recent 
attraction of Chinese oil imports; have all helped to 
push Tokyo closer to Peking.
South China Sea
The disputes over offshore oil claims in the South 
China Sea differ somewhat in character from those in the 
East China Sea. In the former area, the debate (and even 
conflict) is not so much over the delineation of boundaries 
on the continental shelf but about the ownership of ^
groups of islands believed lying above large reserves 
of oil. There are two main groups of islands in dispute - 
the Paracels and the Spratlies. (See Diagram 5.) The 
major claimants to these islands are China, Taiwan, Vietnam 
(Hanoi and Saigon), and the Philippines. As in the East 
China Sea disputes, the role of China, and that country's 
claims vis-a-vis the.other disputants, provides the focus 
of attention. Again, emphasis will be given to those 
aspects of the controversies which help to trace (and, 
perhaps, explain) the changing political relationship 
between China and the other states.
It will be recalled that the 1968/69 CCOP survey 
covered the South China as well as the East China Sea. 
Results of the survey suggested that under those waters 
bounded by Vietnam and Malaysia to the west, China to the
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north, the Philippines to the east, and the island of
Borneo to the south, there were good prospects of
discovering major oil reserves. So enthusiastic were oil
men about the region's potential that there were almost
no bounds to their claims. One went so far as to say
'The potential here is as large if not larger than the 
22Middle East.' Another survey, conducted off the 
coasts of South Vietnam in 1969-70 by Ray Geophysical 
of the USA on behalf of 11 international oil companies 
was equally promising in its findings.
Noi: surprisingly, there was a sudden interest by 
the countries bordering on the South China .Sea in those 
areas believed most suitable as drilling sites for oil.
As shallow areas are the most attractive places in this 
respect, the Parcel and Spratly Islands obviously attracted 
great attention.
Peking, Manila, Saigon and Taipei were most vocal 
in claiming ownership to one, or both, of these two 
island groups. Each country claimed that the historical 
record supported their case. It might be useful to outline, 
very briefly, the various claims.
China claims sovereignty over a very large part of 
the South China Sea. The claims were forcefully reiterated 
in an article with accompanying map (see Diagram 6) 
appearing in China Reconstructs, September, T971. The 
magazine stated 'The Tsengmu Reef, the southernmost part 
of China is close to the equator and stays hot the year
round.'
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The Chinese assert, .quite correctly, that they have
had centuries of contact with the islands. Chinese
trading junks were using these islands as navigational
marks long before Christ. General Shih Po is documented
as having sailed with 1,000 ships via the Paracels en
route to Java at the command of Emperor Kublai Khan in
the twelfth century A.D. The Chinese Mohammedan, Ma Huan,
claimed in the Ying yai sheng lau (General Account of the
Shores of the Ocean - written around 1420) that these
2 3islands were Chinese.
More recently, the Chinese have exercised sovereignty
over the islands. They established a weather station on
the Paracels in the 1930s; and in 1971 it was reported
that the Chinese had 'for many years' maintained a small ^
observation and communications site on Woody (Yunghsing)
2 4Island in the Paracels.
The Nationalist Government in Taipei bases its claim 
to the islands on the same historical (pre-1949) records 
as Peking. Taiwan has had a military presence on the 
Spratlies (on Itu Aba Island) since 1956.
The Vietnamese also present historical records in 
support of their claim to these islands. (As we shall 
note later, it has been Saigon, not Hanoi, that has 
vigorously promoted the Vietnamese case.) It is claimed 
that, in 1802, Emperor Gia Long had created a Dai Hong Sa 
(Company of the Paracels) to supervise the exploitation 
of guano on the islands. In the 1930s the French, on 
behalf of the Vietnamese, officially took possession of 
the Spratly Islands. Moreover, it has been claimed by
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Saigon, during the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951,
none of the 51 powers attending objected to a statement
issued at the time by the Vietnamese that the Spratly and
25Paracel Islands belonged to Vietnam.
The Filipinos are most concerned about establishing
sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. Manila does not
(and cannot) go far back into the historical records in
support of its claim. Under the San Francisco Peace
Conference, Japan renounced 'all right, title and claim
to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.' The
Filipinos claim that as these islands were not then ceded
to any country they were res nullius - 'and may be
acquired by any nation according to the modes of acquisition
2 6recognised under international law.' j
In 1956, a Manila lawyer, Thomas Cloma, claimed 
ownership of the Spratlies and sought protectorate status 
from the Philippines. At that time the Chinese dismissed 
Cloma's claim as 'nonsense' and said the Spratlies belonged 
to China. Saigon made a similar announcement, saying the 
islands were Vietnamese.
Although there was a host of bilateral disputes 
among the Chinese, Vietnamese, Taiwanese and Filipinos 
over ownership of the Spratlies and Paracels, two of 
these disputes are particularly relevant in the context 
of this paper. The first, concerns the competing claims 
between Peking and Manila over the Spratlies. The second, 
and more violent, dispute involves the claims of the 
Chinese and the Vietnamese to both groups of islands.
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These two case studies are particularly interesting for 
they involve two countries - the Philippines and North 
Vietnam - with whom China has a delicate relationship.
It was about two years after the CCOP survey, that
serious disputes broke out in the South China Sea. In
July, 1971, President Marcos protested that Taiwanese
troops had illegally occupied Itu Aba Island in the
Spratlies. He ordered the removal of these troops
'from Filipino territory.' No doubt, the Filipinos were
more interested in the islands' oil potential than in
their security value. ThelVhnila Chronicle was said
to have reported - perhaps wishfully - in July that year
'an influential American oil syndicate with strong
connections in the US Government had been negotiating ^
with Cloma to explore and develop the area considered to
2 7be a potential oil producing region.'
Given Peking's sensitivity over sovereingty to other 
offshore islands (the Tiao-yu-t'ai dispute with Japan 
had only just surfaced), it is not surprising that the 
Chinese reacted strongly to Marcos' statement. Peking 
asserted 'This is a grave infringement upon Chinese 
sovereignty' and urged Marcos to 'withdraw all troops from 
the Nanshas.'  ^®
Since 1973, however, both Peking and Manila have been 
less forceful in pushing their claims against the other.
As noted in Part II, each country has been keen to develop 
closer bilateral ties. The Chinese were disturbed by the 
Soviet Union's improving relations with the Marcos government. 
No doubt it was a Soviet mission in September, 1973, to
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Manila to discuss cooperation in oil exploration off 
the Philippines' coast that prompted Peking's offer to 
sell oil to the Filipinos.
Both Manila and Peking still stand by their claims 
to the Spratlies. Yet neither has returned to the harshly 
worded statements of mid-1971. At the height of the oil 
crisis - in February 1974 - the Philippines felt prompted 
to reiterate its claims to the islands. Peking's 
counter-claim was relatively mild and appeared little 
more than a diplomatic formality.
The dispute between the Chinese and Vietnamese has 
been a much more serious and complex affair. While 
Peking felt it could take a tough stand over ownership 
of the Spratlies and Paracels vis-a-vis Thieu's Saigon, 
it had to be careful not to alienate unduly its communist 
neighbour, Hanoi. This has involved the People's Republic 
in a strange blend of policies varying from total 
inactivity to military action.
It will be recalled that it was the clash between
Filipinos and Taiwanese in the Spratlies in July, 1971,
that prompted all the interested parties to reaffirm
their ownership to various islands in the South China Sea.
China immediately replied that it was the legal owner
of both the Spratlies and Paracels. The Chinese also
began to develop what appeared to be a new naval base in 
29the Paracels. Of course, these islands were of moderate 
strategic significance to Peking, located as they were off 
the entrance to the Gulf of Tonkin and only about 170 miles 
from Hainan. But, as shall be noted below, the Chinese 
were also attracted to the Paracels for their oil potential.
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The South Vietnamese at this time were also showing 
great interest in the potential oil wealth off their 
coasts. In December, 1970, Public Law No.011/70 was 
passed in Saigon with the objective of attracting foreign 
oil capital. The Law had the desired effect and companies 
from the USA, Japan, Canada and France competed for 
offshore oil concessions. It was almost three years 
later when, in August 1973, Saigon signed contracts with 
four major oil companies to explore for oil in the South 
China Sea. In September, the Thieu government announced 
that it had incorporated 11 of the 33 islands of the Spratly 
group into the province of Phuoc Tuy.
Most significantly, the Chinese made no comment
with respect to Saigon's claim. The Economist speculated
that China's strange silence could be because the Chinese
were 'reluctant to confront Hanoi, which could not afford
30to let its nationalism fall behind Saigon's.'
China's ally, Hanoi, was in a terrible dilemma over
this issue. On the one hand, North Vietnam did not wish
to alienate its giant neighbour by contesting China's
claim to the islands. On the other hand, as it dared not
appear to be any less nationalistic than the South, Hanoi
could hardly recognise Peking's claims. Both Hanoi and
the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in the
South took the wisest course and remained silent. President
Thieu, naturally, tried to exploit this issue, hoping to
31create a rift between Hanoi and Peking.
Thieu, however, pushed Peking too far when he dispatched 
a naval assault force to the Paracels in mid-January, 1974.
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The Chinese proved too strong and sank at least one Vietnamese
gunboat and routed the Vietnamese troops remaining on the
barren islands. The New China News Agency said that China
was determined to defend its territorial integrity and
sovereignty and warned that unless the Saigon authorities
'stop their encroachment upon Chinese territory immediately,
32they are bound to eat their own bitter fruit.'
Significantly, shortly after this clash the Chinese were 
reported to have sent in oil drilling equipment to the 
Paracels.
The focus of attention then shifted to the Spratly 
Islands. Undeterred by the recent setback to the north, 
Saigon dispatched a task force to dig in and establish 
themselves in the Spratlies. It was not so easy for the^ . 
Chinese to take strong action this time: first, Taiwan,
the Philippines, and now South Vietnam all had a military 
presence in the island group; and second, the Spratlies 
are much more remote from the Chinese mainland than the 
Paracels.
Even as late as mid-February, 1975, Saigon was
trying to make political capital over the South China Sea
issue. The Vietnam Press on 14 February issued a declaration
by the Thieu government reaffirming its claim to the
Paracel and Spratly Islands which, it said, had been occupied
illegally by China. The declaration regretted that Hanoi
'placed ideological considerations above national interests,'
34and had not spoken out against Peking.
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The fall of Saigon i.h April, 1975 , and the 
establishment of a communist regime in South Vietnam 
has not necessarily resolved this issue. The big question 
is, will Hanoi and the PRG contest Peking's claim to 
sovereignty over the two island groups?
If the earliest actions by the new South Vietnamese 
administration are an accurate guide, there could well 
be a future confrontation (verbal if not military) between 
Vietnam and China over these islands. One of the first 
tasks of the new government in Ho Chi Minh City was to 
replace ARVN troops on the 5£>ratlies with Viet Cong units. 
Moreover, the new administration in the South has not 
ruled out the possibility of foreign oil companies 
participating in the exploration and production of offshore 
oil. There appears to be no strong ideological 
objection by the Vietnamese communists to cooperation 
with Western companies. Hanoi has relied on the USSR 
for many years, and on the Italian State Oil Company (ENI) 
since 1973, to undertake oil exploration both onshore and 
offshore.
Since the fall of Saigon, however, the Spratlies 
and Paracels have not made headline news in Asian newspapers. 
It appears that Peking on the one hand, and Manila and 
Hanoi/Ho Chi Minh City on the other, are determined 
not to let these islands undermine their delicate political 
relationships.
Peking is obviously careful not to lay itself open to 
the charge of being the regional 'bully boy.' Leon Howell 
and Michael Morrow believe Peking's attempts at building
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bridges to the Third World could suffer a setback if 
China took an inflexible stand over the sovereignty issue. 
'As the champion of small nations against "big-power 
hegonism" China cannot afford even a charicaturised image
36as the centre kingdom imposing itself on tribute states.'
China is ever-conscious of the danger that too strong
a stand on the Paracels and Spratlies could drive the
Philippines and Vietnam irretrievably into the arms of
the Soviet Union. Some two years ago, the USSR showed
itself hopeful of gaining political advantage from China's
South China Sea problems. A statement by Tass in February,
1974, observed that 'it is difficult to regard as
accidental the fact that the stepping up of the Maoists'
subversive activity in independent countries coincided
37with Peking's action in the Paracel Islands.' China 
then could have replied that it was merely punishing the 
aggressive actions of the corrupt Thieu regime. With 
the removal of Thieu, and the establishment of a 
Communist government in Saigon, Peking no longer has 
that excuse.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A study of offshore oil claims in East Asia is, 
therefore, a useful vantage point for examining intra- 
regional political relations. The disputes between 
China and some other countries of the region over 
sovereignty to parts of the East and South China Seas 
closely parallel the broader political debate involving 
these countries.
It will be recalled that China's relations with 
most of non-communist Asia were, until the early 1970s, 
marked by suspicion and some degree of hostility. Since 
1972, and especially during the past two years there 
has been a general improvement in Peking's relations with 
some of the region's less violently anti-communist stated. 
The initiative for this thaw has not been completely 
one-sided. Peking - as well as Tokyo, Manila, Bangkok and 
Kuala Lumpur - has been anxious to establish a better 
relationship with many of its neighbours. What prompted 
this more cooperative relationship was the atmosphere 
of political flux and uncertainty engendered by the 
continuing Sino-Soviet dispute, the American military 
withdrawal from mainland Asia, the Sino-American detente, 
and the fall of Saigon.
This trend from hostility to greater cordiality in 
China's relations with some East Asian nations is reflected 
in the off-shore oil disputes considered in Part III.
Immediately after CCOP released the findings of its 
survey in 1969 there was a frantic scramble for sovereignty 
over offshore areas by the coastal states. China was no
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less eager than the other's in claiming ownership of large 
sections of the offlying continental shelves, and strongly 
contested competing claims by Tokyo, Taipei, Seoul, Saigon 
and Manila. For a while, in the early 1970s, it appeared 
that disputes over the Senkakus, Paracels and Spratlies 
could lead to major confrontation between China and some 
of its neighbours.
One might have imagined that the growing world oil 
crisis would provide the catalyst for such a major 
confrontation. Such has not proved to be the case. It 
is true that in January 1974, at the height of the 1973-4 
crisis, relations between some of these states became 
strained over offshore oil claims. But the general trend 
of the past two or three years - at least in the case of >■ 
oil disputes involving countries (the Philippines and 
Japan) with which China has a steadily improving relationship 
has been towards somewhat less hostility and greater 
cooperation.
Such is not the case with respect to those disputes 
involving countries which continue to have poor, or bad, 
political relations with Peking. Again, the history of 
offshore oil controversies parallels broader political 
trends. China's dispute with Thieu's regime over ownership 
of the Paracels and Spratlies was always marked by 
inflexibility and hostility on each side. This culminated 
in the bloody clashes of mid-January 1974.
The history of South Korea's dispute with China has 
also been marked by continued suspicion and a degree of
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hostility on both sides. Seoul has shown itself to be 
far less concerned than Tokyo with China's reaction to 
oil development in the East China Sea. Unlike the Japanese, 
who have still not ratified the Japanese-Korean agreement 
of January 1974, the South Koreans did not hesitate in 
doing so. There are signs that the South Koreans might be 
prepared to develop the oil off their continental shelves 
even without Japanese participation. Peking, together 
with Pyongyang, continues to denounce strongly Seoul's 
plans to 'plunder the oil resources of the East China 
and Yellow Seas.'
The close connection between oil disputes and 
international politics was demonstrated again by Hanoi's 
stand over ownership of the Paracels and Spratlies. The"" 
case study in Part III revealed how the delicate nature 
of North Vietnam's (and the PRG's) political links with 
China was paralleled by the offshore sovereignty issue.
On the one hand, the Vietnamese communists have been 
unwilling to alienate their giant neighbour (and war-time 
ally) by pushing their claims to the disputed islands too 
forcefully. On the other hand, Vietnamese historical 
suspicion of China, together with a desire to appear at 
least as nationalistic as President Thieu, prevented Hanoi 
and the PRG from recognising Peking's territorial claims.
The debate over offshore oil disputes might also 
provide a useful barometer of future changes in inter­
state relations in East Asia. Just as Tokyo's and Moscow's 
attitude towards the 'Northern Islands' issue reveals much 
about the state of Russo-Japanese relations, so might the
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Senkaku Islands problem act as a litmus of Sino-Japanese 
relations. The continuing debate over ownership of the 
Paracels and Spratlies might also act as a signpost to 
future relations between Peking and Vietnam.
This paper has focussed on those oil controversies 
in which China was one of the disputants. There have, 
of course, been many offshore oil disputes in East Asia 
in which China has not been involved. A study of these 
'non-Chinese' controversies might provide interesting 
perspectives on other intra-regional relationships.
Claims to oil in the East China Sea might help to explain 
further Japan's relations with Taiwan and South Korea.
In Southeast Asia, an examination of offshore oil disputes 
might be helpful in describing evolving relations among 
ASEAN members, for example, between Malaysia and Indonesia, 
Thailand and Malaysia, and the Philippines and Sabah.
Again, controversies in the South China Sea and Gulf of 
Thailand might reveal trends in political relations 
between the non-communist and communist states of Southeast 
Asia - for example between Thailand and Cambodia, and 
between Indonesia and South Vietnam. Further, the 
continuing controversy over ownership of Wai Island and 
the surrounding waters, is likely to reflect the broader 
political relationship between the new regimes in Ho Chi 
Minh City and Phnom Penh.
Other approaches to the study of offshore oil 
activities in East Asia recommend themselves to the 
student of international relations. Instead of focussing 
on disputes over offshore oil claims, as this paper has done,
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the student could usefully examine some of the political 
implications of offshore oil production. For example, 
the role of the overseas oil development company in the 
East Asian offshore oil industry might be treated in the 
context of the transnationalist debate. Such an examination 
could consider the degree to which foreign oil companies 
impinge upon the host country's political sovereignty, 
and determine whether foreign oil company investment aggravates 
existing political alienation between the local elites 
and the.mass of the population.
Disputes over sovereignty and development of other 
(non-oil) resources could also be studied for what they 
might reveal about inter-state relations. The newly 
emerging problem of manganese nodule exploitation could,  ^
in the near future, provide one example of such disputes.
The potential for political confrontation over the ownership 
and development of these minerals lying on the deep ocean 
bed has been widely recognised.^ Not unlike the problem 
of offshore oil, the nodules are of great potential value; 
the technology for their exploitation is being developed; 
and they are located in areas the sovereignty of which is, 
at best, vaguely defined in international law.
See for example:
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APPENDIX II
SOME PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SEA
NOTES:
1) This is an unofficial classification according 
to types which appeared in UNITAR News, vol.6, 
No.1, 1974.
Two subjects are considered:
A) Continental Shelf
B) Economic Zone
2) This material has been included to demonstrate 
the highly ambiguous nature of the Law of the 
Sea especially where it relates to areas of the 
seabed containing mineral resources presently, 
or likely to be soon, exploited.
3) The following abbreviations are used:
Con Sh * Continental Shelf
Cs Coastal State
DCS Disadvantaged Coastal State
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EZ Economic Zone
LLS Land-Locked State
NOS National Ocean Space
PS Patrimonial Sea
TS Territorial Sea
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A. CONTINENTAL SHELF
1. NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS 
Type A - Sovereign Rights
(i) [CS exercises sovereign rights for exploring
the shelf and exploiting its natural resources.]
[Sovereignty of CS extends to the shelf.]
(ii) Such rights are exclusive in the sense that no one may undertake these activities, or make claim 
to it, without its express consent, even if it 
does not explore the shelf or exploit the resources.]
(iii) Rights of CS over the shelf do not depend on 
occupation, effective or notiona], or on any 
proclamation.]
(iv) CS is obliged to undertake, in the safety zones, 
all appropriate measures for the protection of 
the living resources of the sea from harmful 
agents.]
Type B - Exclusive Rights
(i) CS shall have exclusive right to explore and exploit and to authorize the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources of sea-bed 
and subsoil in accordance with its own laws and 
regulations in coastal sea-bed economic area.
(ii) CS may take measures to ensure compliance with 
its laws and regulations and apply standards 
for protection of marine environment higher 
than those required by applicable international 
standards pursuant to (iii).
(iii) In exercising its rights, CS to ensure its laws 
and regulations and any other actions taken 
pursuant thereto are in strict conformity with 
provisions of this convention and in particular;
(a) no unjustifiable interference with other 
activities; taking measures to prevent pollution 
of marine environment from these activities; 
compliance with international standards in exis­
tence or promulgated by the Authority or IMCO
to prevent such interference or pollution;
(b) not to impede but to co-operate with the 
Authority in exercise of its inspection functions 
in connection with prevention of pollution;
(c) to ensure licenses, leases, or other contract­
ual arrangements entered into for exploring for 
and exploiting sea-bed resources strictly observed 
according to their terms; property of contract­
ual parties shall not be taken except for a 
public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis;
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(iv)
making prompt payment of just compensation in 
effectively realizable form representing full 
equivalent of property taken; adequate provision 
shall have been made at or prior to taking to 
ensure compliance with these provisions.
Application of compulsory dispute settlement 
procedure and 1962 Rules of Arbitration and 
Conciliation for Settlement of International 
Disputes Between Two Parties of which One is 
a State.
Type C - Exclusive Jurisdiction
(i) The shelf is the natural prolongation of 
continental territory; CS has exclusive jurisdic­
tion over it.
(ii) CS may enact all necessary laws and regulations 
for effective management of its shelf.
(iii) LLS have right to pass through territory, TS 
and other waters of adjacent CS in order to 
have access to and from international sea area;
CS and adjacent LLS shall conclude bi-lateral 
or regional agreements on relevant matters. ^
Type D - Jurisdiction
(i) Jurisdiction of a state may extend to a belt of ocean space adjacent to its coasts.
(ii) Contracting parties to surrender against equit­
able and appropriate compensation claims to jur­
isdiction over sea-bed and waters beyond limits; 
such compensation to be determined by international 
ocean space institutions upon all relevant factors; 
failing that, by binding adjudication of inter­
national maritime court.
(iii) No compensation may be proffered by the instit­
utions to areas adjacent to: reefs and low-tide 
elevations, man-made islands, fixed or floating 
installations, under-water installations or 
works, islets situated within national ocean 
space of a state other than the state exercising 
sovereignty or control over them.
(iv) Ocean space not within limits to form part of 
international ocean space, no part of which 
subject to national jurisdiction for any purpose.
Type E - Right to Establish
CS shall have the right to establish, beyond its 
TS, a coastal sea-bed area.
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Type F
CS right to retain, where its ConSh (namely, 
the natural prolongation of its land mass) 
extends beyond economic zone, sovereign rights 
with respect to that area of sea-bed and sub­
soil thereof which it had under international 
law before entry into force of the convention.
Type G
Islets and smal 1/islands, uninhabited and without 
economic life, situated on the shelf of coast, 
not to possess any of shelf or other marine 
space of same nature.
2. LIMITS
Type A - 200 m./40n.m.
(i) [Area of sea-bed and subsoil adjacent to coast
outside TS] [ConSh] may be established within a 
seaward limit formed by the 200 metres isobath 
line or a line 40 n.m. equidistant from baselines#  
of TS according to choice between the two methods 
of delimitation made at ratification, the choice 
to be final and method chosen to apply to its 
whole coastline.
(ii) In international area, a CS preferential zone or 
intermediate zone may be established within a 
seaward limit formed by a line not more than
40 n.m. equidistant from outer limit of the 
area or the shelf.
Type B - 500 m./100 n.m.
(i) The outer limit of the shelf may be established 
by CS within 500 m. isobath.
(ii) Where isobath situated less than a distance of 100 
n.m. measured from baselines for territorial sea, 
the outer limit may be established along a line 
every point of which is not more than 100 n.m. 
from nearest point of said baselines.
(iii) Where there is no shelf, CS may have same rights 
in respect of seabed as in respect of the shelf, 
within limit indicated in (ii) .
Type C - 200 n.m.
Outer limit of NOS is the line every point of 
which is at a distance from the nearest point of 
baseline equal to breadth of NOS (i.e. 200 n.m.).
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Type D - Continental Margin
The outer limit of the shelf shall not extend 
beyond the outer edge of continental margin.
OR
The shelf comprises the bed and subsoil of the 
sub-marine areas adjacent to territory of state 
but outside area of territorial sea, up to outer 
lower edge of continental margin adjoining 
abyssal plains, or, when that edge is less than 
200 n.m. from coast, up to the distance.
Type E - Submarine Areas
'The shelf refers to: 1(a) sea-bed and subsoil 
of submarine areas adjacent to coast but beyond 
TS, which constitutes a natural prolongation of 
land territory into and under the sea;]
(b) sea-bed and subsoil of [similar] submarine 
areas adjacent to coasts of islands.
Type F - X n.m.
Coastal sea-bed economic area: the area of the 
sea-bed which is seaward of ...; and landward 
of an outer boundary of ....
OR
Coastal sea-bed area, beyond TS, up to a max­
imum distance of X n.m. from applicable base­
line for measuring TS.
Type G - X m./X n.m.
The ConSh: not to extend beyond maximum limit 
of the X Zone, breadth of which is X n.m. meas­
ured from baselines, or the depth of which does 
not exceed X m. isobath, whichever limit coastal 
state may choose to adopt.
Type H - Consultation
Maximum limit of the shelf may be determined 
among states through consultations.
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3. DELIMITATION BETWEEN ADJACENT AND OPPOSITE STATES 
Type A
I.(i) by agreement in accordance with equitable 
principles.
(ii) Where there is an agreement, questions relating
to delimitation to be determined by the agreement.
(iii) No state by reason of this convention to claim 
or exercise rights over natural resources of
any area of sea-bed and subsoil over which another 
state had under international law immediately 
before coming into force of the convention sov-
-ereign rights for exploring it or exploiting its natural resources.
(iv) Subject to provisions above, and unless another 
boundary is justified by special circumstances, 
boundary to be an equidistant line in case of 
adjacent coasts and a median line in case of 
opposite coasts.
OR j
II. (i) Where two or more states whose coasts are 
opposite each other, by agreement between them; 
in the absence of agreement and unless another 
boundary justified by special circumstances, 
boundary to be median line, every point of which 
is equidistant from nearest points of baselines 
for measuring TS.
(ii) Where the shelf adjacent, by agreement between 
them; in the absence of agreement, by principle 
of equidistance from nearest points of baselines.
(iii) In determining boundaries, any lines drawn in 
accordance with (i) and (ii) to be defined with 
reference to charts and geographical features 
as they exist at a particular date, and ref­
erence made to fixed permanent identifiable 
points on the land.
Type B
(i) by agreement among them in accordance with equit­
able principles, taking into account all relevant 
circumstances.
(ii) During negotiation, states to take into account 
special circumstances (e.g. general configurat­
ion, existence of islands or inlets and physical 
and geological structure of marine area involved, 
including sea-bed and subsoil thereof.)
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(iii) States to make use of methods envisaged in 
Article 33 of UN Charter or other peaceful 
means and methods open to them to resolve 
differences during negotiations.
(iv) In absence of special circumstances, due regard 
be given to principles of median line or equi­
distance .
Type C
(i) by agreement among themselves.
(ii) Failing agreement, no state entitled to extend 
sovereignty over the shelf beyond median line 
every point of which is equidistant from nearest 
points on the baselines, continental or insular,
.from which breadth of shelf of each of the two 
states is measured.
Type D
(i) Islands, mutatis mutandis, in same position as 
continental territories so far as rights and 
obligations are concerned, under rules of inter­
national law.
(ii) This principle to apply equally to where coasts 
of two or more states opposite or adjacent to 
each other.
Type E
(i) by agreement in accordance with principle of 
equidistance.
(ii) nothing to prejudice the exisiting agreements.
Type F
(i)
(ii)
between neighbouring states, by agreement based 
on equitable principles, takingyinto account all 
circumstances affecting maritime area concerned 
and all relevant geographical, geological and 
other features.
Islets and small islands not to be taken into 
account for delimitation of shelf between neigh­
bouring states concerned.
Where two states are both adjacent and opposite 
to each other, by appropriate principles and 
methods.
(iii)
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Type G
States adjacent or opposite each other shall 
jointly determine limits of jurisdiction of 
shelf through consultation on an equal footing.
4. NATURAL RESOURCES
Type A
(i) CS [shall have sovereignty over] [exercises 
sovereign rights for exploring the shelf and 
exploiting its] natural resources: mineral 
and other non-living resources of sea-bed and 
subsoil together with living [vegetable] org­
anisms [and animals] of sedentary species (i.e.
[animals] [organisms] which at harvestable stage, 
either immobile on or under sea-bed or unable 
to move except in constant physical contact 
with sea-bed or subsoil).
(ii) Prospecting, exploration and exploitation of 
natural resources subject to regulations of
CS concerned and may be reserved to themselves, 
their nationals, or engaged by third parties 
according to internal laws and international 
agreements.]
(iii) Protection and conservation of renewable 
resources subject to CS regulations and such 
agreements as they may conclude, taking into 
account co-operation with other states and 
recommendations of international technical 
bodies.]
(iv) CS to enact measures to prevent, mitigate or 
eliminate pollution of or from the shelf and 
of its natural resources, taking into account 
co-operation with other states and recommend­
ations of international technical bodies.]
Type B
(i) CS possession of natural resources including 
mineral resources of sea-bed and subsoil and 
living resources of sedentary species.
(ii) States adjacent or opposite to each other to 
conduct necessary consultation to work out 
reasonable solutions for exploitation, regul­
ation and other matters relating to natural 
resources in their contiguous parts.
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Type C
CS sovereign rights for exploring the coastal 
sea-bed area and exploiting its mineral resources.
Type D
(i) CS exclusive right to explore, exploit and auth­
orize exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources of sea-bed and subsoil according to its 
own laws and regulations.
(ii) CS to make available such share of revenue in 
respect to mineral resource exploitation from 
such part of the area as specified in article ...
(iii) If any single geological structure or field of 
any mineral deposit (e.g. gas or petroleum) 
extends across line dividing NOS of two or more 
CS, they shall seek to reach agreement as to 
manner in which such structure or field can be 
most efficiently exploited and manner in which 
costs and proceeds relating thereto shall be 
apportioned; disagreement be submitted to inter­
national maritime court for advisory opinion.
Type E
(i) CS to make contributions to international author­
ity out of revenue derived from exploitation of 
non-living resources of its X zone.
(ii) Rate of contribution to be X per cent of revenues 
from exploitation carried out in that part of the 
zone and X per cent of revenues from exploitation 
carried out beyond X miles or X metres isobath 
within the zone.
Type F
(i) CS to have obligation to transfer to international 
institutions a portion of financial benefits rec­
eived from exploitation of natural resources of 
NOS.
(ii) Provisions relating to living resources under 
other headings.
(iii) CS responsibility to formulate and implement 
necessary programmes of conservation of mineral 
and other non-living resources of NOS and may 
reserve to its nationals exploitation of such 
resources; CS obliged to provide adjacent LLS 
with access to mineral and other non-living res­
ources on conditions similar to those applicable 
to its nationals.
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(iv) CS obligation to take special precautions before
authorizing or undertaking exploitation of petrol­
eum and natural gas in areas subject to frequent 
natural disasters; non-compliance with this pro­
vision entails legal responsibility.
j f
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B. ECONOMIC ZONE
1. NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS
Type A - Exclusive Right
I.
(i) All states have right to establish EZ.
(ii) Exclusive rights over EZ; no other state to 
explore and exploit resources therein without 
obtaining permission.
(iii) Jurisdiction over EZ; third state or its nation­
als to bear responsibility for damage resulting 
from their activities therein.
(iv) No state exercising foreign domination and con­
trol over a territory to be entitled to estab­
lish EZ or to enjoy any other right or privilege 
with respect to such territory. >•
(v) Each state to ensure exploration and exploitation 
activity to be carried out exclusively for peace­
ful purposes and not to interfere unduly with 
legitimate interests of other states in the region 
or those of international community.
OR
II.
(i) Coastal sea-bed area; CS's exclusive right to 
explore, exploit and authorize exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources of sea-bed 
and subsoil .according to its own laws and reg­
ulations .
(ii) CS may take measures to ensure compliance with 
its laws and regulations subject to provisions 
of this chapter and apply standards for protec­
tion of marine environment higher than those 
required by applicable international standards 
pursuant to (iii) .
(iii) In exercising rights above, CS to ensure its 
laws and regulations and any other actions taken 
pursuant thereto in the area are in strict con­
formity with provisions of this chapter and 
other applicable provisions of this convention, 
and in particular: (a) no unjustifiable inter­
ference with other activities; taking measures 
to prevent pollution of marine environment from 
the activities; compliance with international 
standards in existence or promulgated by the 
Authority or IMCO to prevent such interference
80
or pollution; (b) not to impede but to co-operate 
with the Authority in exercise of its inspection 
functions in connexion with prevention of poll­
utions; (c) to ensure licenses, leases, or other 
contractual arrangements entered into for explor­
ing for and exploiting sea-bed resources strictly 
observed according to their terms; property of 
contractual parties not be taken except for a 
public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis; 
making prompt payment of just compensation in 
effectively realizable form representing full 
equivalent of property taken; adequate provision 
shall have been made at or prior to taking to 
ensure compliance with these provisions.
(iv) Compulsory dispute settlement procedure and by 
1962 Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for 
Settlement of International Disputes Between Two 
Parties of which One is a State.
Type B - Exclusive Jurisdiction
I.(i) CS shall have exclusive jurisdiction over EZ 
for protecting, using, exploring and exploiting 
its resources.
(ii) Other state may engage in fishery, mining or 
other activities pursuant to its agreement.
(iii) CS may enact necessary laws and regulations for 
effective regulation of the zone.
(iv) Other states required to observe such relevant 
laws and regulations.
(v) CS right to deal with unauthorized fishery,
mining or other activities in the zone and with 1
violations of its laws and regulations.
OR
II. CS may determine the extent of its exclusive
jurisdiction and control over natural resources 
of maritime area adjacent to its TS.
Type C - Sovereign Rights
CS right to establish, beyond its TS, EZ/PS 
in which it shall have sovereign rights over 
natural resources.
OR
CS sovereign right over an area of sea adjacent 
to TS.
OR
CS to exercise full sovereignty over PS (maximum 
breadth 200 n.m.)*
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* provided that CS right to establish the breadth of 
TS within a limit of 12 n.m.
Type D - Jurisdiction
CS right to establish X zone adjacent to TS and 
shall have jurisdiction for exploring and exploit­
ing living and non-living resources therein.
Type E
CS to establish beyond TS*, coastal sea-bed area 
up to X n.m.
* CS right to determine breadth of TS with a limit 
of 12 n.m.
Type F
(i) CS right to establish PS.
(ii) CS to authorize and regulate emplacement and use 
of artificial islands and any kind of facilities 
on surface, in water column, and on sea-bed and 
subsoil of PS.
(iii) Other states in exercising freedom and rights con­
ferred by the convention not to interfere in CS 
activities relating to natural resources.
(iv) In exercising its jurisdiction and supervision 
over exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources, CS to take measures to ensure such 
activities to be carried out with due consider­
ation for other legitimate uses by other states.
Type G
Within the limit of TS (200 n.m.) each state has 
right to establish other modalities or combinations 
of legal regimes of sovereignty, jurisdiction or 
specialized competence in marine area adjacent to 
its coasts.
2. LIMITS
Type A - 200 n.m.
(i) Beyond and adjacent to its TS within the maximum 
limit of 200 n.m.* measured from [applicable] 
baselines for measuring TS.
(ii) [To be reasonable] taking into account [local] 
regional, geographical, geological, ecological, 
economic and social factors and preservation of 
marine environment.
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OR
(ii) On the basis of regional factors, taking into
account resources in the region, and rights and 
interests of developing geographically DS, with­
out prejudice to limits adopted by any state 
therein.
OR
(ii) In accordance with its geographical and geological 
conditions, state of its natural resources and 
needs for national development.
* Some states have indicated that this limit is proposed 
together with a territorial sea with a limit of 12 n.m. 
and that they must be considered as a whole.
Type B - 200 n.m. and more
(i) Beyond and adjacent to its TS within the maximum 
limit of 200 n.m. measured from [applicable] base­
lines for measuring TS.
(ii) or where continental margin extends beyond 200 n.m. 
from such baselines, beyond outer edge of cont- *  
inental margin where continental rise joins abyssal 
plain.
OR
(ii) CS to retain, where its ConSh (i.e. natural pro­
longation of land mass) extends beyond (EZ/PS), 
the sovereign rights with respect to that area 
of sea-bed and subsoil thereof which it had 
under international law before entry into force 
of the convention; such rights do not extend 
beyond outer edge of continental margin.
OR
(ii) or up to a greater distance coincident with 
epicontinental sea (i.e. the column of water 
covering sea-bed and subsoil situated at an 
average depth of 200 metres).
Type C - X n.m.
Coastal sea-bed area: beyond limit of its TS 
(not exceeding 12 n.m.) to the maximum limit of 
X n.m. from applicable baselines for measuring 
breadth of TS.
OR
Coastal sea-bed economic area: the area of the 
sea-bed which is seaward of ...; and landward of 
an outer boundary of ....
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Type D
The regime of TS us also applicable to EZ.
3. DELIMITATION BETWEEN ADJACENT AND OPPOSITE STATES
Type A
(i) To be determined in accordance with international 
law [including application of median line of 
equidistance.]
(ii) Disputes arising therefrom to be settled in con­
formity with UN Charter and any relevant regional 
arrangements.
Type B
(i) by agreement among them in accordance with equit­
able principles, taking into account all relev­
ant circumstances.
(ii) During negotiations, states to take into account 
special circumstances (e.g. general configurat­
ion, existence of islands or islets and physical"' 
and geological structure of marine area involved, 
including sea-bed and subsoil thereof).
(iii) States to make use of methods envisaged in Article 
33 of UN Charter or other peaceful means and 
methods open to them, to resolve differences 
during negotiation.
(iv) In absence of special circumstances, due regard 
be given to principles of median line or equi­
distance .
Type C
(i) Agreement among themselves.
(ii) Failing such agreement, no state is entitled to 
extend its jurisdiction over EZ beyond median line 
every point of which is equidistant from nearest 
points on baselines, continental or insular, from 
which breadth of EZ of each of two states is mea­
sured .
Type D
I.
(i) Islands are, mutatis mutandis, in same position 
as continental territories insofar as rights and 
obligations are concerned, under rules of inter­
national law set out herein.
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(ii) Above principle to apply equally where coasts 
of two or more states are opposite or adjacent 
to each other.
OR
II. EZ of an island to be measured as a continental 
land mass, except as otherwise specified for 
delimitation of ocean space of adjacent or opp­
osite states.
Type E
(i) in accordance with equitable principles.
(ii) When there is an agreement, questions relating 
to delimitation to be determined in accordance 
with provisions of agreement.
(iii) No state shall by reason of this convention claim
or exercise rights over natural resources of any 
area of sea-bed and subsoil which another state 
had under international law immediately before 
coming into force of this convention sovereign 
rights for exploring it or exploiting its natural 
resources. *
(iv) Subject to (i) and (iii) above and unless another 
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, 
boundary to be an equidistant line in the case of 
adjacent coasts and a median line in the case of 
opposite coasts.
Type F
(i) through consultations on an equal footing.
(ii) CS concerned, on basis of safeguarding and res­
pecting sovereignty of each other, to conduct 
necessary consultations to work out reasonable 
solutions for exploitation, regulation and other 
matters relating to natural resources in contig­
uous parts of EZs.
4. NATURAL RESOURCES 
Type A
(i) CS sovereign rights over renewable and non-renew­
able natural resources of waters, sea-bed and 
subsoil thereof.
(ii) CS right to adopt measures to ensure its sovereignty 
over resources.]
CS jurisdiction and supervision over exploration 
and exploitation of such resources and over allied 
activities.]
(iii)
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Type B
(i) CS sovereign right over renewable and non-renew- 
able natural resources, living and non-living, 
in the area.
(ii) Prospecting and exploration of the area and 
exploitation of natural resources subject to CS 
regulations and such activities may be reserved 
to themselves or to their nationals, or allowed 
to be engaged by third parties in accordance 
with provisions of internal laws and of inter­
national agreements.
(iii) Protection and conservation of renewable resources 
subject to CS regulations and to agreements as 
they may conclude, taking into account co-oper­
ation with other states and recommendations of 
international technical bodies.
Type C
(i) CS sovereignty over renewable and non-renew­
able natural resources for exploration and 
exploitation; exclusive jurisdiction to control, 
regulate and exploit living and non-living 
resources and their preservation.
(ii) CS sovereignty and jurisdiction to encompass all 
economic resources, living and non-living, on 
water surface, in water column, or on soil or 
subsoil of seabed and ocean floor below.
(iii) CS to establish special regulations for exclusive 
exploration and exploitation, and for protection 
and conservation of renewable resources.
Type D
(i) CS ownership- over all natural resources, living 
or non-living, of whole water column, sea-bed 
and subsoil.
(ii) Exclusive jurisdiction over the zone for pro­
tecting, using, exploring and exploiting such 
resources.
(iii) Other state may engage in fishery, mining or 
other activities pursuant to its agreement.
Type E
CS sovereign rights for exploring coastal sea­
bed area and exploiting its non-living resources.
Type F
(i) CS jurisdiction for exploring and exploiting 
living and non-living resources in the zone.
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(ii) CS to make contributions to international
authority out of revenues derived from exploit­
ation of non-living resources.
OR
(ii) CS to make available such share of revenue in 
respect of mineral resources exploitation from 
such part of the coastal sea-bed economic area.
(iii) Rate of contribution to be X per cent of revenues 
from exploitation carried out in the zone, and
X per cent of revenues from exploitation carried 
out beyond X miles or X metres isobath within 
the zone.
(iv) .Contributions to be distributed by international
authority on basis of equitable sharing criteria.
Type G
No state shall by reason of this convention claim 
or exercise rights over natural resources of 
any area of sea-bed and subsoil over which another 
state had under international law immediately 
before entry into force of this convention sov- «/ 
ereign rights for exploring it or exploiting its 
natural resources.
Type H
(i) Nationals of DCS to have right, in the region, 
to exploit, on a reciprocal and preferential 
basis, renewable resources within PS or EZ of 
states of the region; procedures for such pref­
erential regime to be determined by regional, 
subregional and bilateral agreements.
(ii) Nationals of geographically DCS to have right 
of equal access to living resources of PS or 
EZ in convergent areas.
(iii) Above provisions not to apply to territories 
under foreign domination or forming an integral 
part of metropolitan powers outside the region.
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